The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov recently told CNN in an interview that Israel’s security is one of Russia’s “top priorities.” When the interviewer asked him how this could be, given that Russia is allied with Iran in Syria, the Deputy Foreign Minister said, “I wouldn’t use this type of words to describe where we are with Iran. We are working together with them and … they were very helpful when we convened the National Congress of the people of Syria in Sochi, but we do not see at any given moment completely eye-to-eye on what happens.” Ryabkov then went on to talk about Russia’s efforts to persuade Iran to withdraw heavy equipment from the Israeli-Syrian border last year to ensure Israel’s security.

I give the exact quote because anyone who thinks Russia and Iran are allies, and especially the Iranian government, should read it in full. This is not a soundbite taken out of context that is misconstruing Ryabkov’s words. This is a very open commitment to the security of Israel, in complete disregard and to the detriment of the interests of Iran. And this is not the first time: Russian President Putin expressed the same position to the Americans last summer when he told them that he does not have the same interest as Iran in Syria, and that he would like to talk about ways to get them out. One would think Iran and Russia’s ostracization by the West for decades would make them natural allies. However, Russia has rarely (if ever) defended Iranian interests. It certainly did not stop then-President Dimitry Medvedev from acquiescing to a UN Security Council resolution in 2010 and signing a decree banning the export of arms to Iran, for example. Trade between the two remains lackluster. Indeed, one cannot claim Iran ever gained much from this so-called alliance.

Furthermore, “we do not see at any given moment completely eye-to-eye” is an understatement for what is happening in Syria at the moment. It is not widely reported in the news, but tension between different military bodies fighting in Syria, some backed by Iran and others by Russia, has recently boiled over to the point of open confrontation. The two main characters in this dispute are Suheil al Hassan, who commands the elite Tiger Forces and is backed by Russia, and Maher al Assad, who is President Bashar al Assad’s brother, leads the 4th Division, and is known to represent Iran’s interests in the Syrian leadership. Heavy clashes have been reported between the forces of both sides in the past few weeks, while Moscow has allegedly repeatedly refused Maher al Assad’s requests for a meeting. News broke this week that Russian forces had also blown up bridges on the Euphrates River held by Iranian militias. This does not exactly sound like the outcome of a healthy alliance.

Syria would do well not to rely on Russia either, even though the reason Russia launched military operations in Syria was ostensibly in response to a request for help from President Assad. Recall the incident last September, when Syrian air defenses accidentally shot down a Russian military plane while defending against an Israeli attack. Russia blamed Israel and, two weeks later, provided Syria with the S-300 missile defense system, almost as a punishment for Israel for the incident. However, Russia does not seem to want Syria to use the system if it clashes with its own interests (which evidently include the security of Israel), in which case it is worth nothing when its utilization is supposed to be dependent on Russian foreign policy priorities and not on those of their owner, Syria. Furthermore, the S-300 system and its placement in Masyaf raises questions about Russia’s intentions. First, Israel knows this system well and, together with Israel’s military experience and capabilities, it is unlikely to pose a formidable threat to its operations in Syria. Second, the S-300 system is stationed in Masyaf, in northwest Syria, quite far from southern Syria where most of the Israeli strikes have been targeting, and pushing the maximum range of the system’s capacity. Russia does not need these S-300s to be in Masyaf for its own protection either – Masyaf is about 50 km from Hmeimim air base, which is far better equipped (with S-400s, among other layers of defense) than anything the S-300 could contribute. So why put them in Masyaf? The only logical conclusion is that the delivery of the S-300 system was more a jab at Israel, a symbolic rebuke in response to the airplane downing incident, rather than a serious attempt to curb Israel’s operations against Syrian and Iranian military targets in Syria. Its proximity to Hmeimim means Russia can keep an eye on it, and it is unclear to what extent the Russian forces will turn its operation over to the Syrians anyway.

Thus, it does not appear that Russia is serious about helping Syria defend itself. In Iran, it sees a rival for influence in Syria. It is clearly not on Syria and Iran’s side when it comes to Israel – Iran’s top security threat and priority. Russia’s general intentions in the region are clear. If Russia actively pursues this path, then it will inevitably clash with Iran.

Russia and Iran won Syria together. Now they are competing for the spoils. Iran must rethink its strategy of alliance with Russia. The writing is on the wall, and the sooner Iran comes to this realization, the better.

By Ardavan Amir-Aslani

The shaky status quo in Syria’s northwest area, one of the few remaining pockets where remnants of the Syrian opposition are concentrated (and the most populous one), gave out last week. The area had been relatively quiet since September, after an agreement between Turkey and Russia suspended an anticipated government offensive to take it by force, which would have likely resulted in significant civilian casualties. The agreement, which was never fully implemented but held nonetheless, put much of the burden on Turkey, who was to ensure the withdrawal of extremist groups, namely a coalition of al Qaeda-affiliated armed groups called Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS). It also envisioned a demilitarized zone in the area that would be absent of heavy weaponry, and the opening of the segments of the M4 (Aleppo-Lattakia) and M5 (Aleppo-Hama) highways that passed through this area, which was particularly important for the Assad government to resume trade.

However, recent in-fighting between HTS and the National Liberation Front (NLF), the other major coalition of armed groups in the area who is backed by Turkey, ended with the complete capitulation of the NLF and resulted in a ceasefire agreement that more closely resembles a surrender. According to the HTS-NLF ceasefire, while the NLF’s armed forces will continue to remain in certain areas, civilian administration will be entirely turned over to HTS’s administration branch, the Syrian Salvation Government. This development signals HTS’ assertion of total civilian authority in the enclave along with overwhelming military control, not only indicating Turkey’s failure to keep the terms of its agreement with Russia, but by default necessitating that any future discussions over the area must include HTS participation and buy-in. It also provides justification for the Assad government and Russia to resume military operations on the area and brings the Assad government one step closer to controlling Syria in its entirety. In other words, it is the de facto end of the Turkey-Russia agreement that staved off the government offensive in the area and puts this option squarely back on the table.

It is worth considering these developments against a backdrop of increased international confusion regarding Syria, particularly over the past month stemming from the mixed signals sent by the Trump administration regarding US presence in the northeast of the country. After President Trump’s announcement of almost immediate withdrawal was extended and muddled by further statements from him and various other US officials, it was announced last week that the withdrawal had officially begun. If and when the withdrawal is completed, the fate of this area and the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will in large part be left to the same actors who are involved in northwest Syria: Turkey, Russia, and the Assad government. Though US officials are scrambling across diplomatic channels to protect their SDF partners, determining their fate or the future of this area is neither in the US operation’s mandate nor capacity to influence in their current form.

To further add to the confusion, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made a speech in Cairo last week, where he stated in no uncertain terms that the US is committed to expelling “every last Iranian boot,” and confirmed that the US would not provide any reconstruction funds to the Assad government “until Iran and its proxy forces withdraw.” This is a pipe dream if there ever was one: Iran is quite unlikely to cede its position in Syria willingly after such a hard-earned victory, nor does it have any reason to sever its ties with the Assad government who it dedicated substantial financial and military resources to keep in place. Realistically, given the current mood of the US public opinion and the White House which is very wary of getting involved in the Middle East, it is safe to assume that Secretary Pompeo’s words are just that – words.

Returning to northwest Syria, it is now up to the Assad government, Russia, and Turkey to decide the fate of this area. Turkey has legitimate concerns that a military operation to take northwest Syria would result in a humanitarian catastrophe, not to mention the flight of the area’s some three million residents to the Turkish border. However, Turkey is far more interested in northeast Syria, where the US withdrawal leaves behind a battle-hardened and well-armed SDF which Turkey considers among its highest security threats. Indeed, there are almost daily reports of an anticipated Turkish operation to take Manbij. As such, this may mean Turkey is willing to concede northwest Syria to the Assad government and Russia, in return for a favorable arrangement in northeast Syria. Whatever the three parties decide, it will also likely establish the foundation for future collaboration between the Assad government and Turkey in this final episode of the Syrian conflict.

By Ardavan Amir-Aslani

Watch the debate on France 24 :

Part 1 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gphxBxCfxMQ’>watch?v=gphxBxCfxMQ

Part 2 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=atsfjn5o6Ic’>Part 2

France 24, thursday 23th january 2014

Syrian peace talks are underway in Switzerland, and already it’s fair to assume that after Geneva 2, there will be a Geneva 3, and perhaps even Geneva 4. Damascus’ top backer Iran was uninvited, and Bashar al-Assad shows no sign of being ready to step down. In fact, fighting on the ground has actually intensified, with jihadists making it a three-way fight. So what’s the point in these talks?

Watch the debate on France24.